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THE MARKETPLACE OF TWITTER: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE 
PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
Elijah Hack  
I. INTRODUCTION 
From before the United States’ inception, the nation’s leaders and 
thinkers placed high value on the protection of speech. The framers’ 
believed that by permitting uninhibited political discourse, the best ideas 
would emerge and be refined so that truth could prevail. In his book On 
Liberty, John Stuart Mill summarized this belief in a doctrine that has 
come to be known as the “marketplace of ideas.”1 Mill believed that 
human beings ought to be free to make their own judgements on ideas, 
not have ideas and opinions filtered through government.2 He believed 
that ideas can be fully discussed and matured through debate in the 
marketplace.3 Mill believed that ideas evolved in conflict, so that the best 
parts of divergent ideas contributed to a whole truth.4  
Additionally, Mill believed that when opinion is silenced, humanity 
suffers: “The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, 
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing 
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who 
hold it . . . .”5 Mill believed that when government extinguishes opinions 
before they reach the marketplace, free individuals are unable to make 
their own judgements in seeking truth.6 True opinions, however, are 
resilient according to Mill: “[The] real advantage which truth has [is] that 
when an opinion is true it may be extinguished once, twice, or many 
times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to 
rediscover it, until [eventually] it has made such head as to withstand all 
subsequent attempts to suppress it . . .”7  
Moreover, Mill believed that ideas could be fully and freely articulated 
until they developed to truth through the marketplace. Even if an opinion 
 
 1. It must be noted that the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor was never coined in On Liberty, and 
scholars debate whether it properly portrayed Mill’s liberalism or his philosophy on free speech. See Jill 
Gordon, John Stuart Mill and the ‘Marketplace of Ideas,’ 23 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE, 235, 235-
249, (1997), https://www.jstor.org/stable/23559183 [https://perma.cc/UDK4-KP3D]. 
 2. See GEOFFERY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, & MARK V. TUSHNET, 
Constitutional Law, (4th ed., 2001), 998-999. 
 3. See id.  
 4. See id.  
 5. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Geoffery R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and 
Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law, (Fourth Edition, 2001) (Casebook Author’s emphasis). 
 6. See id.  
 7. Id.  
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was true, Mill believed the test of the marketplace added invaluable 
opportunity: “[However true an opinion] may be, if it is not fully, 
frequently, and fearlessly discussed it will be held as a dead dogma, not a 
living truth.”8 Knowledge and appreciation of all sides of an issue, Mill 
theorized, is essential to the truth-seeking function of free speech: “[He] 
who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. [Even if] 
the received opinion [is] true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential 
to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth . . . .”9 
Further, Mill believed that conflicting opinions are valuable in the 
construction of a whole truth. “[T]he conflicting doctrines, instead of 
being one true and the other false, [may] share the truth between them; 
and the nonconforming opinion [may be] needed to supply the remainder 
of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part.”10 
According to Mill, all opinions are necessary in the marketplace in order 
to provide nuance and find truth: “[Every] opinion which embodies 
somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought 
to be considered precious.”11 
Mill likely did not envision the state of truth and speech in 2019. His 
ideas, however, resonate in the era of “fake news” and partisan 
reporting.12 In July 2016, a Pew Research study showed that seventy-four 
percent of Americans believe that the news media is biased in their 
coverage of politics and social issues.13 The distrust of media is 
particularly alarming given the current polarization of Americans in their 
news consumption; a 2014 Pew Research study found that consistent 
liberal and conservative Americans are likely to receive their news from 
likeminded sources.14 The poll shows that consistent liberals and 
conservatives are more likely to trust likeminded news sources as opposed 
to those expressing views which conflict with or challenge their own.15  
 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id.  
 10. Id.  
 11. Id.  
 12. “Fake News” is a term popularized by President Donald Trump used to refer to news sources 
or stories he believes mislead the public or are incorrect.  
 13. Amy Mitchell, Jeffery Gottfired, Michael Barthel, & Elisa Shearer, The Modern News 
Consumer, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (July 7, 2016) http://www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/trust-and-
accuracy/ [https://perma.cc/M5EP-CAVG].  
 14. Amy Mitchell, Jeffery, Gottfried, Jocelyn Kiley, & Katerina Eva Masta, Political Polarization 
& Media Habits, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (October 21, 2014) 
http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/  [https://perma.cc/7RKU-
V9K6]; In particular the research shows that 47% of consistent conservatives receive their political news 
from Fox News, while consistent liberals name CNN (15%), NPR (13%), MSNBC (12%), and the New 
York Times (10%) as their main sources for political news.  
 15. Id. The poll found that 88% of consistently conservative individuals trust Fox News, while 
consistent liberals are more likely to trust public news sources like NPR (72%), PBS (71%) and BBC 
(69%).  
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In this era of siloed news, social media has come to occupy a 
particularly interesting role in exposing individuals to conflicting ideas. 
More than sixty-nine percent of Americans use social media. and only 
twenty-three percent say that the political posts they see on Facebook are 
in line with their own views.16 In particular, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey 
expressed the site’s commitment to neutrality in his testimony before the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee amid claims that Twitter had 
an anti-conservative bias.17 Dorsey claimed that “[W]e don’t consider 
political viewpoints, perspectives, or party affiliation in any of our 
policies or enforcement decisions . . . [i]mpartiality is our guiding 
principle.”18 Dorsey believed that Twitter occupies an important role in 
the shaping of political discourse. Dorsey tweeted:   
We believe many people use Twitter as a digital public square. They gather 
from around the world to see what’s happening and have a conversation 
about what they see. Twitter cannot rightly serve as a public square if it’s 
constructed around the personal opinions of its makers. We believe a key 
driver a thriving public square is the fundamental human right of freedom 
of opinion and expression. Our early and strong defense of open and free 
exchange as enabled Twitter to be THE platform for activists, marginalized 
communities, whistleblowers, journalists, governments and the most 
influential people around the world. Twitter will always default to open 
and free exchange.19 
Dorsey’s idyllic perception of the role of his company in the 
marketplace of ideas reflects the enduring power and popular assumption 
of Mill’s philosophy. Like the theoretical marketplace of ideas envisioned 
by Mill, it seems Dorsey believes Twitter’s space in the larger community 
of political discourse is crucial because of its impartiality and openness.  
Implicit in Dorsey remarks is the importance of the space in which 
speech takes place. The Supreme Court has interpreted the First 
Amendment to protect speech on government property historically used 
for public expression. 20 The so-called “public forum” doctrine protects 
speech in places which have been traditionally devoted to public debate.21 
The application of the public forum doctrine has typically been a 
 
 16. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (February 8, 2018). 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/2G4U-FDM4 ], (finding that 
numbers of social media users are particularly high for young adults- 88% for ages 18-29); Political 
Polarization & Media Habits, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-
polarization-media-habits/ [https://perma.cc/SS69-TNU6] 
 17. Jack Dorsey, @jack, (September 5, 2018, 12:31 pm), 
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1037422913819959298 [https://perma.cc/SM3J-GML6]. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992), [hereinafter ISKCON]. 
 21. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
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historical exercise—consisting of an analysis of the history of using a 
particular space, or category of spaces, for communicative purposes.22 
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine to expand 
beyond spatial limitations.23 While the Supreme Court has not discussed 
whether to doctrine expands to social media, the rapid expansion of the 
internet and online forums like Twitter and Facebook demands that the 
traditional notions of forums and speech must evolve in order to properly 
protect political speech.  
As Dorsey mentions, Twitter has become the platform for political 
leaders.24 Two of these leaders are United States President Donald Trump 
and Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin, who frequently use Twitter and 
Facebook as a means of communicating with their constituents. Both 
Bevin and Trump have been sued for “blocking” users on Twitter who 
replied to their tweets with unfavorable opinions.25 This article will 
explore the two lawsuits, their conflicting opinions, and what these 
opinions mean for the evolution of speech in the internet age. Part II will 
explore the history of the public forum doctrine, the government speech 
doctrine, and the competing approaches of Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy in ISKCON v. Lee.26 Part III will outline the reasoning of the 
district courts in the Hargis v. Bevin and Knight First Amendment Institute 
at Columbia University v. Trump cases.27 Part IV will apply Justice 
Rehnquist’s categorical analysis to find that the interactive spaces of 
Twitter and Facebook should constitute a designated public forum. Part 
V will apply Justice Kennedy’s analysis and advocate for its adoption 
because of its flexibility and focus on the actual uses of forums as opposed 
to their historical attributes.  
II. BACKGROUND  
In order to properly analyze the importance of social media in today’s 
marketplace, it is crucial to understand the history of the various doctrines 
that have played a role in American free speech doctrine over the nation’s 
 
 22. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 672.  
 23. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995), 
[hereinafter Rosenberger]. 
 24. See Dorsey, supra note 17.   
 25. See Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at 
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), [hereinafter Trump]; When a user 
“blocks” another user on Twitter, the “blocked” user is unable to view anything on the page of the blocking 
user, including any posts of the blocking user or any replies to those posts. A Facebook page differs from 
a profile in that it is public to other Facebook users. The administrator of a particular page may “ban” 
users from the page which will still allow them to view posts on the page, but a banned user is unable to 
comment or post on the banning user’s page.   
 26. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678, 694. 
 27. See Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1003; Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 541. 
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history. This Part provides this needed background. First, section A will 
explore the evolution of the categorical approach to the public forum 
doctrine. Next, section B will discuss the divergent approaches of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s categorical analysis and Justice Kennedy’s more case 
specific approach that have been presented by the justice in various 
Supreme Court opinions. Finally, section C will outline the government 
speech doctrine which becomes relevant when speakers are government 
actors. 
A. Categories of Government Property 
In analyzing speech on government property, the Supreme Court has 
adopted a categorical analysis, first defining the nature of the property and 
then deciding whether a limitation on speech is permissible.28 Justice 
White introduced this categorical approach to speech regulations on 
government property in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local 
Educators Association, differentiating between (1) traditional or 
quintessential public fora, (2) designated public fora, and (3) nonpublic 
fora.29  
The first category of public fora is the traditional public forum. 
Traditional public fora, according to Perry, are places “which by long 
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate 
. . . .”30  The Court recognizes that traditional public fora include streets, 
parks, and other things “immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the 
public and [that], time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.”31 Past Supreme Court cases have shown the Court’s 
propensity to limit the application of the traditional public forum 
designation, but the Court does afford traditional public fora the 
protection of strict scrutiny due to their historical and political 
importance.32 In this context, strict scrutiny means that time, place, 
manner, and content-neutral restrictions on speech are permissible in a 
traditional public forum only when they are narrowly tailored to achieve 
a significant governmental interest and leave open alternative 
communicative channels.33 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
 
 28. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
 29. Id. at 45-46.  
 30. Id. at 45.  
 31. Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 32. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992), 
 33. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Professor A. Chris Bryant, University of Cincinnati Rufus King 
Professor of Constitutional Law, introduced a test for whether a speech restriction is content-based or 
content-neutral. Referencing “The Andy Griffith Show,” Professor Bryant suggested the following 
“Mayberry” test: Suppose Barney Fife were to come into Sheriff Andy Taylor’s office and proclaim, 
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Education Fund, the Court established that “[b]ecause a principal purpose 
of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be 
excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary.”34  
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization was the first instance 
in which the Court introduced these special protections for government 
property that have traditionally been used as a means of discourse.35 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause and 
Due Process clause, the Hague Court invalidated a city ordinance 
prohibiting street meetings and public assembly.36  The Court held that 
certain special protections are afforded to streets and parks due to their 
role as a medium for public discourse.37 “Such use of the streets and 
public places has, from ancient times been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.” The Court concluded that the 
special role of streets and parks in the tradition of public discussion means 
that such spaces are subject to a higher level of scrutiny when speech is 
regulated or denied.38  
The second category of fora is a designated public forum. Designated 
public fora, also known as limited-purpose public fora, come into 
existence when the government intentionally opens its property for public 
discourse.39 Designated public fora differ from traditional public fora in 
that their existence depends more on the intention of government than the 
historical significance of a particular space.40 According to Cornelius, 
“the government does not create a public forum by inaction or by 
permitting limited discourse but only by intentionally opening a 
nontraditional forum for public discourse.”41 Once government decides to 
use its property in a way that creates a designated public forum, “[t]he 
Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum… 
even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.”42 
Designated public fora are not limited by the same spatial or geographic 
bounds of a traditional public forum.43 For example, the Court has 
employed the designated public forum analysis to the funding of printing 
 
“Andy, there are troublemakers handing out pamphlets on the courthouse lawn.” If Andy Taylor responds, 
“Pamphlets on the courthouse lawn? That is not allowed!” then the restriction is likely content-neutral. If 
Andy Taylor instead were to respond, “What did the pamphlets say, Barney?” before deciding whether to 
act, then it is likely that the restriction is content-based. THE ANDY GRIFFITH SHOW, CBS (1961). 
 34. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).  
 35. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-516.  
 36. See id. at 516.  
 37. Id. at 515. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992), 
 40. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 43. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
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student publications at a public university.44 The government may set 
limits on designated public fora to exclude a class of speech, also known 
as content-discrimination, in order to preserve the forum for the purpose 
for which it was created.45 However, viewpoint-discrimination, which is 
regulation that excludes speech due to its particular opinion or perspective 
on a subject matter, is impermissible within a designated public forum 
just like it is impermissible in a traditional public forum.46  
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the 
Court found that the University’s refusal to fund the publication of Wide 
Awake Productions, a student-run, Christian newspaper, was 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.47 The Court found that the 
University, through its student activity fund, “[did] not exclude religion 
as a subject matter, but select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student 
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”48 The prohibition 
of a “specific premise, perspective or standpoint,” was not a permissible 
content-based restriction for the preservation of the forum, but instead 
amounted to impermissible viewpoint-discrimination according to the 
Court.49  
A third category of government property is nonpublic fora. Private 
individuals are not guaranteed access to government property for speech 
purposes simply because the property is owned or controlled by 
government.50 If government property does not fall within the limited 
scope of a traditional public forum or if the government does not 
intentionally open the space for public discourse, then the property is 
outside the scope of forum analysis.51 In a nonpublic forum, the 
government “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, 
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public 
officials oppose the speaker’s point of view.”52 If the intended purposes 
of the government property are not compatible with expressive activity, 
then the government, like any property owner, is not required to allow 
expressive activity.53  
The Supreme Court applied the nonpublic forum analysis to an 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 829-830.  
 46. Id. at 830.  
 47. Id. at 831.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
 50. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981). 
 51. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 819 (1985). 
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interschool mailing system in Perry.54 The Court found that because the 
“normal and intended function of the school mail facilities is to facilitate 
internal communication of school-related matters to teachers,” the 
mailing system was not a public forum under the First Amendment.55 The 
Perry School District did not open its mail system to the general public 
for communicative purposes and, therefore, did not create a public 
forum.56 Consequently, to allow indiscriminate access to the mail system 
would frustrate the intended purposes of the property; therefore, the Court 
held that the restrictions on access were permissible under the First 
Amendment.57  
B. Competing Approaches to Public Forum Doctrine in ISKCON v. Lee 
The Court’s use of a categorical approach in application of the public 
forum doctrine has resulted in a static, unresponsive doctrine heavily 
focused on an inflexible and literal interpretation of fora and speech and 
a lack of sensitivity to the values of the First Amendment.58 But the 
doctrine has not developed without serious opposition within the Court.59 
This disagreement was first introduced in ISKCON v. Lee. The plaintiffs 
in ISKCON, a Krishna religious group, sued the police superintendent 
seeking an injunction to a regulation limiting solicitation within an airport 
terminal.60 The group argued that the regulation violated the right to free 
speech in a forum context.61  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion 
and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion best display the disagreement 
between members of the Court.62 Rehnquist’s opinion best exemplifies 
the governing categorical approach, while Kennedy’s opinion offers an 
alternative case-by-case approach to public forum doctrine.63  
Rehnquist’s approach strictly followed the categorical method 
developed in Perry, Cornelius, and subsequent cases.64 Rehnquist first 
 
 54. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.  
 55. Id. at 47-48; However, it is important to note that the mailing system was opened to select 
private organizations such as the Cub Scouts, YMCA’s, and parochial schools. The Court conceded that 
such action did create a forum, but even if it did, the forum analysis was only applicable to other similar 
groups, such as the Girl Scouts or other similar organizations.  
 56. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.  
 57. See id. at 49.  
 58. See Lillian R. BeVier Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories. 
1992 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 79-122, 81-82 (1992), www.jstor.org/stable/3109668 
[https://perma.cc/9GND-DD7C].  
 59. Id. at 96. 
 60. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 674 (1992). 
 61. Id.  
 62. See BeVier supra note 58, at 96-99.  
 63. Id.  
 64. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678-679.  
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dismissed any notion that airport terminals could be considered a 
traditional public forum citing Hague—“[G]iven the lateness with which 
the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for 
the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of mind’ been held 
in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.”65 Because 
airports, and particularly the use of airports as a forum for the distribution 
of religious material, is a recent phenomenon, Rehnquist argued that the 
practice does not “demonstrate that airports have historically been made 
available for speech activity.”66 Likewise, Rehnquist rejected the 
argument that airport terminals would qualify as a designated public 
forum because they were not “internationally opened by their operators 
to such activity.”67 According to Rehnquist, airports are a nonpublic 
forum—they are government property opened for “the purpose of . . . 
facilitat[ing] air travel, not the promotion of expression.”68 After reaching 
this conclusion, the Court specified that speech restrictions in any 
nonpublic forum need to only meet the reasonableness standard of the 
Court and are not subject to strict scrutiny.69 Rehnquist explained that due 
to “the disruptive effect that solicitation may have on business,” the 
regulation is reasonable.70  
 Kennedy began his concurring opinion by challenging the established 
categorical analysis of the public forum doctrine. Kennedy claimed it 
“ought not be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert 
what was once an analysis protective of expression into one which grants 
the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.”71 According to 
Kennedy, under the categorical method, government is free to restrict 
speech on its property so long as it articulates a non-speech-related 
purpose for the area.72 This makes it nearly impossible for the 
development of new public forums, Kennedy argued.73 Kennedy claimed 
that under the Court’s categorical forum analysis, “in almost all cases the 
critical step in the Court’s analysis is a classification of the property that 
turns on the government’s own definition or decision, unconstrained by 
an independent duty to respect the speech its citizens can voice there.”74 
In regards to traditional public fora, Kennedy argued that “[t]he Court’s 
 
 65. Id. at 680 (quoting Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 682. 
 69. Id. at 683.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 694. 
 72. Id. at 695. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  
9
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analysis rests on an inaccurate view of history.”75 Kennedy argued that 
even the most basic of recognized traditional public fora have a principal 
purpose other than speech.76 “It would seem apparent,” Kennedy stated, 
“that the principal purpose of streets and sidewalks, like airports, is to 
facilitate transportation, not public discourse, and we have recognized as 
much.”77 Kennedy urged the Court to reconsider the First Amendment as 
“a limitation on government, not a grant of power.”78  
 As an alternative, Kennedy offered a new standard to judge public 
fora—“[i]f the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue 
and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the 
government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and 
compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum.”79 Kennedy 
suggests that the proper method would be to analyze  
whether the property shares physical similarities with more traditional 
public forums, whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in 
broad public access to the property, and whether expressive activity would 
tend to interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the government 
has . . . dedicated the property.”80  
In response to the category of designated public fora, Kennedy 
conceded that “government always retains authority to close a public 
forum, by selling the property, changing its physical character, or 
changing its principal use.”81 
Applying his own standard to the case at bar, Kennedy concluded that 
“it is evident that the public spaces of the Port Authority’s airports are 
public forums.”82 Kennedy found that the airport terminals were 
physically similar to streets in that they were “broad, public thoroughfares 
full of people and lined with stores and other commercial activities.”83 
Second, Kennedy cited that the areas are open to the public and frequently 
used by over 78 million passengers per year.84 “It is the very breadth and 
extent of the public’s use of airports that makes it imperative to protect 
speech rights there,” he argued.85 Third, Kennedy found that any 
disruptive effect speech could have on the airport’s primary purpose can 
 
 75. Id. at 696. 
 76. See id.  
 77. Id. at 696-697.  
 78. Id. at 695. 
 79. Id. at 698.  
 80. Id. at 699-700.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 700.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
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be curtailed with adequate time, place, and manner restrictions without 
limiting expression.86 “The Authority has for many years permitted 
expressive activities by the petitioners and others,” Kennedy wrote, 
“without any apparent interference with its ability to meet its 
transportation purposes.”87 Applying this somewhat novel approach to the 
forum doctrine, Kennedy found that the restriction on the distribution of 
materials in the airport was overbroad and did not survive the Court’s 
strict scrutiny on restrictions of speech.88 However, he concluded that the 
ban on solicitation of funds survived the test as “either a reasonable time, 
place, and manner restriction, or as a regulation directed at the nonspeech 
element of expressive conduct.”89  
Kennedy believed the public forum doctrine left “almost no scope for 
the development of new public forums” and would lead to a “serious 
curtailment of our expressive activity.”90 Despite Kennedy’s proposal, 
Rehnquist’s application of the categorical reasoning of Perry is followed 
by lower courts today.91 While certainly inflexible, the public forum 
doctrine provides district courts with a workable standard for judging 
speech rights on government property.92   
C. Government Speech Doctrine 
While the First Amendment prohibits government from restricting the 
speech of private individuals, the prohibition does not apply when 
government speaks for itself.93 Two cases, Pleasant Grove v. Summum 
and Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 
summarize the government speech doctrine.94  
In Pleasant Grove, a unanimous Supreme Court found that in a public 
forum, government may limit expressive activity when it is determined 
that the government is speaking for itself and is not limiting the speech of 
others.95 In Pleasant Grove, a religious organization requested that the 
City of Pleasant Grove erect a donated monument containing “the Seven 
Aphorisms of SUMMUM,” the major tenets of their religion which are 
 
 86. See id. at 701. 
 87. Id.  
 88. See id. at 703. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 695, 698.  
 91. See Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at 
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 92. See BeVier, supra note 58, at 121.  
 93. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009). 
 94. Id. at 460; Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 95. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 464.  
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similar to Ten Commandments.96 The park already contained eleven other 
donated permanent structures including a Ten Commandments 
monument and a September 11th monument.97 The city denied the request. 
The Court held that the city was able to deny the request without violating 
the First Amendment because the erection amounted to government 
speech, not the restriction of private speech.98 “The Free Speech Clause,” 
the Court wrote, “restricts government regulation of private speech; it 
does not regulate government speech.”99 Government has the right to 
speak and may select which views that it wants to express.100 The Court 
admitted that while in some cases it may be difficult to determine whether 
or not the government was the speaker, the erection of a permanent 
monument clearly fell within the realm of government speech.101 
Walker presented the Court with exactly the problem that was 
previously foreshadowed in Pleasant Grove. In a 5-4 decision written by 
Justice Breyer, the Court determined that Texas did not violate the First 
Amendment by not permitting the Sons of Confederate Veterans to create 
and use a specialty license plate featuring a Confederate flag.102 The Court 
interpreted Pleasant Grove to create a three-part test that it used to 
determine that the specialty license plate was government speech—(1) 
whether there is a history of government using a medium to convey 
government speech, (2) whether the speech is “often closely identified in 
the public mind” with the government, and (3) whether government 
maintains direct control over the messages conveyed.103 Applying this test 
to the specialty license plate program, the Court found, first, that States 
have a long history of using license plates to convey government speech 
such as “slogans urging action, promoting tourism and touting local 
industries.”104 Second, the Court found that Texas license plates are 
closely identified with government because the plate was a government 
identification article and contained the name of the state – “TEXAS.”105 
Third, the Court found that because Texas Motor Vehicles Board 
approved each design, they effectively controlled the messages conveyed 
on the license plates.106  
 
 96. Id. at 465.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 467.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 467-468.  
 101. Id. at 470.  
 102. Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2241 (2015).  
 103. Id. at 2242 (quoting Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 472).  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion seemed to scoff at the idea that the specialty license 
plates could be government speech, and offered the following anecdote to prove the absurdity:  
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III. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A PUBLIC FORUM 
Public officials’ use of social media presents an interesting 
Constitutional question under the public forum and government speech 
analyses. Two conflicting cases, Hargis v. Bevin,107 and Knight First 
Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump,108 illustrate a 
current circuit split considering whether a public official violates the First 
Amendment by “blocking” an individual from commenting on the public 
official’s social media account. In Section A, this Article analyzes the 
Bevin case and demonstrates how the Bevin court found that a public 
official’s use of social media is not subject to the forum analysis at all 
because it consists of government speech, not private speech.109 In 
Section B, this Article summarizes the Trump court’s use of Rehnquist’s 
categorical approach to conclude that the interactive space on social 
media was a designated public forum, not government speech.110 
A. Hargis v. Bevin 
In Bevin, Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin “blocked” plaintiff Drew 
Morgan on Twitter after Morgan made comments regarding Bevin’s 
overdue property taxes.111 Similarly, Bevin banned Mary Hargis from his 
 
 
Here is a test. Suppose you sat by the side of a Texas highway and studied the license plates on 
the vehicles passing by. You would see, in addition to the standard Texas plates, an impressive 
array of specialty plates. (There are now more than 350 varieties.) You would likely observe plates 
that honor numerous colleges and universities. You might see plates bearing the name of a high 
school, a fraternity or sorority, the Masons, the Knights of Columbus, the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, a realty company, a favorite soft drink, a favorite burger restaurant, and a 
favorite NASCAR driver. 
 
As you sat there watching these plates speed by, would you really think that the sentiments 
reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners 
of the cars? If a car with a plate that says “Rather Be Golfing” passed by at 8:30 am on a Monday 
morning, would you think: “This is the official policy of the State—better to golf than to work?” 
If you did your viewing at the start of the college football season and you saw Texas plates with 
the names of the University of Texas’s out-of-state competitors in upcoming games—Notre Dame, 
Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma, Kansas State, Iowa State—would you assume that 
the State of Texas was officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns’ opponents? 
And when a car zipped by with a plate that reads “NASCAR - 24 Jeff Gordon,” would you 
think that Gordon (born in California, raised in Indiana, resides in North Carolina) is the official 
favorite of the State government? Id. at 2255. 
 107. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
 108. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
 109. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1010. 
 110. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549.  
 111. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.  
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Facebook page after Hargis criticized Bevin’s right-to-work policies.112 
Hargis and Morgan sued for declaratory and injunctive relief in the 
Eastern District of Kentucky asserting that Bevin’s actions on social 
media violated their First Amendment rights.113  
The district court first recognized that this “is a case of first impression 
in the Sixth Circuit and, if appealed, would be a case of first impression 
to the Supreme Court of the United States as well.”114 The Court 
recognized the novel legal issue at bar and decided to exercise caution 
when proceeding, heeding Justice Alito’s words to “‘proceed 
circumspectly, taking one step at a time,’ when applying the Constitution 
to social media.”115  
The Court began by reflecting the positions of the parties: the plaintiffs 
argued that Twitter and Facebook are traditional public fora, subject to 
strict scrutiny for any content-based discrimination.116 Bevin countered 
by arguing that Twitter and Facebook are limited fora, and that 
restrictions of speech in this context were permissible because they were 
viewpoint neutral and reasonable for the purpose of the forum.117 The 
Court then proceeded to summarize Rehnquist’s categorical approach to 
public forum doctrine.118  
The Court, however, was unconvinced by both arguments, and 
proceeded to analyze the claim under the government speech doctrine of 
Walker.119 The Court noted that it “is convinced that Governor Bevin’s 
use of privately owned Facebook and Twitter pages is personal speech, 
and, because he is speaking on his own behalf, even on his own behalf as 
a public official, ‘the First Amendment strictures that attend the various 
types of government-established forums do not apply.’”120 The Court 
asserted that “privately owned channels of communication,” such as 
social media, “are not converted to public property by the use of a public 
official.”121 If Governor Bevin had sought to open a forum to allow public 
discourse, and allow everyone’s comments, he could have done so. But, 
the Court argued, he did not set up his accounts to allow for such 
 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 1008.  
 114. Id. at 1009.  
 115. Id. (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1744 (2017) (Alito, J., 
concurring)). 
 116. Id. at 1010.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1010.  
 119. Id. at 1010-1011.  
 120. Id. at 1010-1011 (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2239, 2250 (2015)). 
 121. Id. at 1011. 
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commentary and “the First Amendment does not require him to do so.”122 
The Court held that “Governor Bevin is under no obligation to listen to 
Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have no Constitutional right to be heard in this 
precise manner.”123 If Governor Bevin’s social media accounts were 
susceptible to forum analysis, and he was unable to block constituents 
from the accounts, “his accounts could be flooded with internet spam such 
that the purpose of conveying his message to his constituents would be 
impossible and the accounts would effectively, or actually, be closed.”124  
Instead of working through Rehnquist’s categorical forum analysis, the 
Court decided the government speech doctrine is applicable in this 
case.125 Because Governor Bevin is speaking as the Governor, the Court 
argued, he is “permitted to cull his desired message through his Facebook 
and Twitter page . . . .” 126 Analogizing to Pleasant Grove and Walker, the 
Court held that when the government speaks, it is not engaging in 
viewpoint discrimination by preferring some speech over others.127 The 
Court concluded that “Governor Bevin is not required to allow the public 
to speak for him.”128 
The Court ended its analysis of Bevin’s social media by proposing a 
political, and not legal solution.129 In the end, the Governor, and all other 
elected public officials are accountable to the public.130 In this case, “[t]he 
public may view his Page and account if they wish and they may choose 
to re-elect him or choose to elect someone else if they are unhappy with 
how he administers his social media accounts.”131 The ballot box and not 
the judicial system, the Court believed, is the proper mechanism for 
plaintiffs to obtain relief.132  
B. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump 
In Trump, the Southern District of New York used Rehnquist’s 
categorical approach to conclude that the interactive comment space 
created when President Donald Trump posted to Twitter was a designated 
 
 122. Id. at 1012.  
 123. Id. at 1011.  
 124. Id. at 1012. 
 125. Id. at 1012-1013.  
 126. Id.   
 127. Id. at 1012.  
 128. Id. at 1013. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
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public forum.133   
The Court began by explaining the interactive features of Twitter as a 
social media platform, and specifically the President’s Twitter page 
@realDonaldTrump and the plaintiffs’ relation to the account.134 The 
Court explained that a “defining feature of Twitter” was a user’s ability 
to interact with the posts or “tweets” of other Twitter users.135 Users are 
able to repost or “retweet” another user’s tweet, “like” or “favorite” 
another’s tweet, or “reply” to another user’s tweet.136 A user also has the 
option to “mention” another user’s profile in a tweet of their own to make 
reference to the other user.137 Once mentioned, the mentioned user will 
receive a notification that they were mentioned by the mentioning user.138 
In addition to all of the interactive features, the court recognized that 
Twitter has two primary features meant to limit interaction—“blocking” 
and “muting.”139 When a user blocks another user, the blocked user is 
unable to view or interact with any of the blocking user’s tweets or view 
their “followers” or “following” lists.140 The blocked user can still 
mention the blocking user, but the blocking user will not receive a 
notification nor be able to view the blocked user’s tweets.141 Muting, on 
the other hand, does not prohibit a muted user from replying, retweeting, 
or favoriting the muting user’s tweets.142 A muted user’s tweets are simply 
not visible to the muting user, and the muted user does not receive any 
sort of notification that they have been muted.143 
The Court then turned its analysis to President Trump’s account and 
recognized that “[s]ince his inauguration in January 2017, President 
Trump has used @realDonaldTrump as a channel for communicating and 
interacting with the public about his administration.”144 In particular, the 
Court found:  
 
 133. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 134. See id. at 550-553. 
 135. Id. at 550. 
 136. Id. at 550-551.  
 137. Id. at 551.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 552, 576; It is important to note that, in dicta, the court seems to assert that the act of 
muting an account may not violate an individual’s First Amendment rights. Muting, instead of blocking 
does not prohibit an account from replying to the President’s tweet, even when the reply is eventually 
ignored. A muted tweet may be viewed and replied to by others, therefore, allowing the essential 
interactive feature. Facebook also contains a similar function known as “unfollowing.” For more 
information on “unfollowing,” see Facebook, How do I Unfollow a Person, Page or Group?, (2019),  
https://www.facebook.com/help/190078864497547. 
 143. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 552, 576. 
 144. Id.  
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President Trump uses @realDonaldTrump, often multiple times a day to 
announce, describe, and defend his policies; to promote his 
Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; to 
engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; to challenge 
media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he believes to 
be unfair; and for other statements, including on occasion statements 
unrelated to official government business.145 
Some announcements relating to official government business, in 
particular the nomination of Christopher Wray for FBI director, and the 
removals of then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs David Shulkin, were announced on @realDonaldTrump 
before other channels of communication.146 President Trump’s account is 
generally accessible to the public at large without regard to political 
affiliation or other limiting criteria.147 The Court found that 
@realDonaldTrump’s tweets typically generated thousands of replies, 
favorites, and retweets.148  
The plaintiffs in the case, Rebecca Buckwalter, Philip Cohen, Holly 
Figuero, Eugene Gu, Brandon Neely, Joseph Papp and Nicholas Pappas, 
each tweeted a message critical of the President in a reply to a tweet from 
@realDonaldTrump.149 In response, the account blocked each of the 
plaintiffs for their criticism of the President and his policies.150 While the 
plaintiffs were blocked by @realDonaldTrump, the Court recognized that 
the plaintiffs are not totally unable to interact with the President’s 
tweets—for example they may create a second account to view the tweets 
or they may view or reply to replies of the President’s tweet.151  
After an overview of the plaintiffs and organization’s standing, the 
Court analyzed whether the plaintiffs’ speech was protected under the 
First Amendment, why the government speech exception is not invoked, 
and how the forum doctrine applies under the circumstances.152  
The Court found that the plaintiffs wished to engage in political speech 
which “fall[s] within the core of First Amendment protection.”153 The 
Court continued by noting that the plaintiffs’ speech did not fall within 
the limited categories of speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment and instead fit squarely within the realm of protected 
 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 553. 
 147. Id. at 572.  
 148. Id. at 552-553.  
 149. Id. at 553. 
 150. Id. at 554.  
 151. Id.  
 152. See id. at 564, 572.  
 153. Id. at 565 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008)). 
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speech.154 
Next, the Court found that a forum analysis could be limited to certain 
aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account, not the account as a whole.155 
The Court did not suggest that plaintiffs should have access to the 
@realDonaldTrump account as a whole, but acknowledged that the 
interactive space of each tweet by the President is susceptible for the 
forum analysis.156 The Court found that the content of the 
@realDonaldTrump tweets was government speech because it met the 
three prong test of Walker.157 However, the Court disagreed with the 
Bevin court and found that the “interactive space for replies and retweets 
created by each tweet” was not government speech and was instead the 
private speech of the replying or retweeting user.158 The replies to 
@realDonaldTrump’s tweets were not controlled by the account and they 
were most directly associated with the replying user.159  
Finally, the Court found that forum doctrine applied because the 
interactive space associated with each tweet was government property, 
and individual speech was consistent with the intended purpose of the 
forum.160 The Court found that while Twitter was a privately-owned 
company, the control exercised by the President amounted to government 
ownership.161 Unlike ISKCON, the government property was more 
metaphysical than spatial or geographic, but, like Rosenberger, that 
distinction did not defeat a forum analysis.162 In addition, private speech 
would not defeat the essential function of the forum.163 The interactive 
space associated with each tweet could accommodate virtually an 
unlimited number of replies and retweets and, as the Court recognized, 
the essential function of the interactive space in the tweet was to allow 
private users the opportunity to engage with @realDonaldTrump’s 
speech.164  
After concluding that a forum analysis was appropriate for the 
interactive space of @realDonaldTrump’s tweets, the Court decided that 
it was best classified as a designated public forum.165 The Court held that 
the space was not a traditional public forum because there was no 
 
 154. Id. at 565.  
 155. Id at 566. 
 156. Id. at 566. 
 157. Id. at 571. 
 158. Id. at 572. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 572-573. 
 161. Id. at 566-567.  
 162. Id. at 566. 
 163. Id. at 573. 
 164. Id. at 573.  
 165. Id. at 574-575. 
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extended historical practice of using the interactive space of a tweet for 
speech primarily because there was not an extended historical practice of 
using Twitter or other social media.166 The Court concluded that the space 
was a designated public forum  because the government allowed anyone, 
regardless of political affiliation, to access the tweets and used the tweets 
“as a means through which the President ‘communicates directly with 
you, the American people!’”167  
Because the Court found that the interactive space created by the 
President’s tweets was a designated forum, any restriction of speech was 
only permissible if the restriction was narrowly drawn to achieve a 
compelling state interest and did not engage in view-point or content-
based discrimination under the ISKCON standard.168 The Court found that 
@realDonaldTrump’s blocking of users was impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination primarily because the parties actually stipulated to the fact 
that the users were blocked due to the viewpoints expressed in their 
posts.169 Similar to the holding of Bevin, Trump argued that the President 
retained a personal First Amendment interest in choosing the people he 
associates with and that the individual plaintiffs had no right to have their 
views amplified by the government.170 The Court responded by 
recognizing that by blocking users on Twitter, the government went 
beyond merely amplifying the voice of one speaker and instead actively 
restricted the rights of individuals to advocate ideas.171 While injunctive 
relief was requested by the plaintiffs, the Court concluded that a 
declaratory judgement would likely achieve the same purpose172  
IV. RE-APPLYING THE REHNQUIST APPROACH 
This Part will analyze whether public officials who use social media, 
in particular Twitter and Facebook, and block individuals while using the 
 
 166. Id. at 574. 
 167. Id. at 574 (quoting Stipulation ¶ 37). 
 168. Id. at 575.  
 169. Id. (citing Stipulation ¶ 53).  
 170. Id. at 575.  
 171. Id. at 576.  
 172. Id. at 579; President Trump appealed the District Court’s decision which was affirmed by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals on July 9, 2019. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. 
Trump, 928 F. Supp. 3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). Similar to the Southern District of New York, the Second 
Circuit focused on President Trump’s intent in operating the account, and how the features of Twitter 
enabled users replying to the President to be heard by a wide audience. See Id. at 238. The Court rejected 
President Trump’s argument that the speech may be controlled as government speech because the speech 
in question concerned the speech of multiple users, not just the government. See Id. at 239. The Court 
ended its opinion alluding to the marketplace of ideas rationale by reminding the litigants (and the public) 
that the best response to disfavored speech on matters of public concern was more speech, not less. Id. at 
240. 
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platform limit speech in a way that violates the First Amendment. In 
Section A, this Article will explain why the government speech exception 
should not be invoked under these circumstances and why a political 
solution is inadequate. In Section B, this Article applies the Rehnquist 
approach to public fora to conclude that a public official’s use of social 
media to disseminate information and connect with constituents should 
constitute a designated public forum and therefore be subject to a strict 
scrutiny analysis.  
A. Blocking Individuals Does Not Invoke the Government Speech 
Exception 
In Bevin, the court did not analyze the blocking of individual users from 
the Governor’s Facebook and Twitter because it found that the 
government speech exception was invoked.173 The Bevin court 
determined that because the public official was speaking for the 
government, he was permitted to favor some speech over others.174 The 
court decided that constituents unhappy with Governor Bevin’s use of 
social media should seek a political solution rather than a legal one.175  
While this analysis may be applicable to the content of the Governor’s 
messages, invoking the government speech exception to individuals’ 
comments and replies is wholly inconsistent with the government speech 
doctrine. The Bevin court argues that because the governor is using 
Twitter and Facebook to communicate his own message, he is able to 
curtail this message by silencing the speech of individuals wishing to 
engage with his speech. The court fails to properly recognize that in reply 
tweets and Facebook comments, there are clearly two independent 
speakers engaged—the public official who wrote the tweet or post, and 
the private individual engaging with the post. Applying the Pleasant 
Grove test as interpreted in Walker, it is clear that the government speech 
exception cannot apply to comments or replies to the social media post of 
a public official.  
In applying the Pleasant Grove test, a court should first look at whether 
there is a history of government use of the medium to convey government 
speech. Though the history is short, government officials have begun to 
use social media extensively as a means of connecting with voters and 
rationalizing political acts.176 But to say that there has been any history of 
 
 173. See Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010-11 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
 174. See id. at 1011.  
 175. See id. at 1013.  
 176. It would seem functionally inconsistent to claim that there is a long history of government 
using social media in the government speech context, while discounting that same history in a traditional 
public forum analysis when individual speech is involved. The court in Bevin, however, reasoned so.   
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public officials managing the responses to their own messages would 
directly contradict the purpose of the First Amendment and the 
established history of its application. Individuals and organizations 
responding to a Tweet or Facebook post cannot be considered government 
speech in the same way that a news source’s criticism of a public official’s 
action is not government speech. By blocking individual speech replying 
to government announcements, a public official is significantly limiting 
the marketplace of ideas as envisioned by Mill and the framers of the First 
Amendment.  
Second, the court should examine whether the speech is “often closely 
identified in the public mind” with the government.177 Within the social 
media arena, it would be functionally impossible for this prong to be met 
because the limited speech is a reaction to government speech, not 
government speech itself. Unlike Walker, where license plates were 
closely associated in the public mind with government, an individual’s 
private critique of government in the form of a social media post is not. 
A reply tweet on Twitter is a unique message which features the replier’s 
profile name and photo, while the original Tweet from a public official 
features their own profile name and photo. Similarly, on Facebook a 
comment features the commenter’s name and picture, while the original 
post features the name and picture of the public official. The speech of 
government and the response of the individual are not conflated as it was 
in Walker where the message of the interest group appeared on the same 
license plate as the state name. Therefore, it would be improper to claim 
that a reply or comment to an original post, which is an independent 
message, would be closely identified in the public mind with a 
government official or government in general.  
Third, the court should examine whether the government maintains 
direct control over the messages conveyed. On Twitter and Facebook, a 
public official is able to control the content of his or her own messages 
but has no control over the reply or comments of individuals. Unlike 
Walker, there is no government office that approves the comments or 
replies of individual users on social media. The critical or supportive 
tweets are not approved by an administrative office nor are they ratified 
by the public official who initially tweeted.  
While the content of a public official’s Tweets and Facebook posts 
would clearly seem to invoke the government speech doctrine, applying 
the doctrine to the replies and comments of private individuals is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Pleasant Grove 
in Walker because (1) there is no history of blocking individuals as a 
 
 177. Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (2015) (quoting 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)). 
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means of promoting a government’s message, (2) the speech is closely 
identified with the individual commenter, not the government, and (3) the 
government has no control over the messages conveyed in the replies or 
comments.  
B. The Interactive Space is a Designated Public Forum 
First, a court using the Rehnquist approach of ISKCON should 
conclude that the interactive space created when a public official posts on 
social media is not a traditional public forum. Traditional public fora are 
notoriously rigid, and the court must find that the government property is 
“immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the public . . . used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions,” in order to qualify as a public forum.178 
Under this standard, it is highly unlikely that Twitter, Facebook, or any 
other Internet forum would qualify as a traditional public forum. Despite 
the extensive use of internet fora as a means of promoting political 
objectives, there is not the same history associated with internet fora as 
streets, parks, and other traditional public fora. Similar to the airport 
terminals in ISKCON, social media is too modern of a development in 
human history to qualify as a traditional public forum.  
Continuing with the Rehnquist approach, a public official’s social 
media post does create a designated public forum because when a public 
official posts to social media, they are intentionally opening a space for 
the purpose of public discussion and speech. Every tweet or post sent by 
a public official is an individual outward act of opening a space for 
discourse. When a public official posts she is not creating a public forum 
by inaction, but is “intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for 
public discourse.”179  
In fact, Trump’s own rationale for creating a Twitter account was “as 
a means through which the President ‘communicates directly with you, 
the American people!’”180 The President set up his Twitter page for the 
purposes of communicating with his electorate. A public official’s 
affirmative act in creating a tweet goes further than mere acquiescence; 
instead, it is an invitation for discourse which may not be rescinded 
simply because the public official is unhappy with the response of the 
constituents.  
In addition, individuals’ speech on social media is not incompatible for 
the purpose for which the forum was created because the forum was 
 
 178. Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
 179. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
 180. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Stip, ¶ 37). 
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created for communicative purposes. It would be logically incoherent to 
conclude that a public official creating a social media account in order to 
communicate with her constituents would have the purpose of the forum 
compromised by communication. Nor is the number of speakers 
problematic for the purposes of the forum analysis. Twitter and Facebook 
are able to accommodate virtually an unlimited number of speakers; there 
is no problem of some speakers frustrating the purposes of the forum.  
Governor Bevin argued, and the Bevin district court agreed, that the 
problem of spam made it necessary for a public official to maintain the 
ability to silence commenters in order to use the pages for their intended 
purpose. While this may be a valid concern, it can be cured through means 
which do not violate the First Amendment as impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination. A public official may use permissible content-based 
restrictions in order to limit a class of speech as spam. If replies to a post 
are truly off base to a point where they have no communicative value, a 
public official may remove them as long as she does so regardless of 
viewpoint.  
If this standard was to be applied, however, it is not difficult to imagine 
how a public official’s definition of spam may be politically motivated. 
Consequently, it may be difficult to draw a bright-line rule with a content-
based restriction. However, with the mute function on Twitter and the 
unfollow function on Facebook, a public official may essentially ignore 
any individuals’ posts or comments on their tweet or post without 
infringing upon their right to free speech. As the Bevin court correctly 
described, “Governor Bevin is under no obligation to listen to Plaintiffs, 
and Plaintiffs have no Constitutional right to be heard in this precise 
manner.”181 But the right to be heard is not the same as the right to speak. 
A public official may limit her own hearing of an individual’s free speech, 
but she may not inhibit an individual from speaking once a forum has 
been created.  
In conclusion, when a public official intentionally opens a space online 
for the purpose of facilitating communication, she has created a 
designated public forum and may not limit speech based on viewpoint. 
The act of creating this forum is intentional and the forum may support 
an unlimited number of speakers without compromising the purpose for 
which it was created. Spam can be addressed using permissible content-
based restrictions.  
 
 181. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1011 (E.D. Ky. 2018). 
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V. KENNEDY’S APPROACH AFFORDS BETTER PROTECTION TO INTERNET 
PUBLIC FORA 
The difficulties of categorizing and defining public fora, and 
particularly internet fora, could be addressed by replacing Rehnquist’s 
categorical analysis with Kennedy’s approach in ISKCON.  Kennedy 
believed that the “physical characteristics of the property at issue” and the 
“actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the 
government” should determine whether or not a particular space is 
protected under a forum analysis.182 Kennedy believed that by looking at 
how government property was similar to existing fora, how the fora was 
actually used, and whether expressive activity would interfere with the 
purposes of the property, courts could more accurately protect expression 
on government property.  Kennedy’s test provides flexibility for the 
evolution of technological advances and future internet fora while 
focusing on the actual uses of a forum rather than its uses in the past.  
First, the Kennedy approach would allow for more flexibility in forum 
analysis which is particularly useful in the internet age. By permitting a 
court to analogize speech within a new space to existing fora, Kennedy’s 
method is unlike Rehnquist’s approach in that it does not close the door 
to the evolution of new spaces used primarily for speech. Rehnquist’s 
categorical method will never afford the same protections to emerging 
communicative spaces, such as airport terminals or social media, as those 
provided to existing traditional public fora. Rehnquist’s method will 
always disfavor new technologies and spaces simply because of their 
recency. However, under Kennedy’s approach, if a court determines that 
a new forum shares enough similarities with an existing forum, speech in 
the space can be protected. Given the rapid rise of social media in the last 
decade, it is impossible to predict what new platforms may emerge in even 
the next five years. Given the recent history, however, one could safely 
assume that public officials will use any emerging internet platforms as a 
means of spreading their message and connecting with their constituents. 
If government intends to continue to use social media as a means of 
sharing its message, speech that disagrees with or challenges such action 
must be permitted. The analogization exercise proposed by Kennedy will 
give litigants the opportunity to argue that a new forum is similar to or 
different from those fora already recognized. A judge can then assess the 
arguments of both sides and use her discretion to determine whether or 
not the forum is similar enough to existing ones to afford it special 
protection. The analogization exercise of the Kennedy approach does not 
foreclose the possibility of emerging fora and provides more flexibility in 
 
 182. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992). 
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assessing the merits of the government property through its analogization 
exercise. 
Second, the Kennedy method focuses more on the actual uses of a 
forum than its historical significance. Today, as more than 69% of 
Americans use social media, the political speech presented in replies to 
government posts should be more protected because of the popularity and 
uses of the platforms. As more people use social media for the purposes 
of political expression, traditional spaces for political expression are 
being replaced with virtual ones. Public officials have recognized this 
shift, and have begun to use social media sites in order to spread their 
messages and connect with voters. By allowing and encouraging 
interactive activity on social media sites, it is clear that public officials 
have at least “acquiesced in the broad public access” to the property.183 
Through the social media accounts of public officials like Trump and 
Bevin, the government has intentionally opened virtual property for the 
purposes of communicating and millions of Americans are taking the 
opportunity to use the space for expression. By intentionally opening 
government property for communicative purposes, the Kennedy approach 
dictates that the interactive space on social media must be protected as a 
public forum. The actual uses of government property should be more 
dispositive than a historical analysis of the property. While history can 
provide guidance and stability in a forum analysis, it can also hinder the 
development and protection of new fora. If adopted, the Kennedy method 
would allow government property that has been used for communicative 
purposes to be protected as a public forum.  
Third, Kennedy’s test would look at whether expressive activity would 
undermine the purposes of the property as it was created. It is logically 
incoherent to conclude that expressive activity in response to a public 
official’s social media posts would interfere with the purposes for which 
the property is used because the property was created for expressive 
activity. The government cannot be permitted to open up virtual property 
in order to communicate with constituents and then claim that the 
communicative activity of those constitutes undermines the purposes of 
the forum. By permitting expressive activity, the government is not 
ratifying the speech of dissidents as their own. Public officials are not 
even required to read or respond to that speech. But if a public official 
opens up a virtual profile for the purpose of communicating with the 
American public, pursuant to the First Amendment, they must be required 
to allow expressive responses and not discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint. 
 
 183. Id. at 699. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The circuit split displayed by Bevin and Trump illustrates the difficulty 
of applying Rehnquist’s categorical analysis to emerging internet fora. 
Rehnquist’s analysis focuses on the historical attributes of a given forum 
which leads to an inherently conservative application of the public forum 
status. This approach does not consider the real uses of the space relating 
to speech; instead, it protects government more than it ensures the 
protection of speech. Nevertheless, the Court’s use of the Rehnquist 
approach in Trump shows the approach’s potential for a more malleable 
categorical method that could adapt to speech associated with new 
technologies and spaces.   
However, replacing Rehnquist’s approach with Kennedy’s approach 
would provide more flexibility for the emergence of new public fora by 
focusing on the actual uses of the forum rather than the historical 
significance of a space. Kennedy’s approach would also better adhere to 
the spirit and purpose of the First Amendment as described in Mill’s 
marketplace of ideas. At their best, social media networks like Twitter 
and Facebook can be used to debate political issues pulling from an 
international range of perspectives and experiences. In fact, there is no 
better place to engage in this political discussion than on a platform 
intentionally opened up by a public official for the purposes of 
announcing policy and defending political viewpoints. Dorsey’s vision of 
Twitter as a virtual public square may be idyllic, but by properly 
protecting speech in this narrow space and prohibiting viewpoint 
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